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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant, the City of Pittsburgh, filed this antitrust 
action against West Penn Power Company, d/b/a Allegheny 
Power, and Duquesne Light Company alleging that the two 
companies entered into a pre-merger agreement in restraint 
of trade and that their proposed merger would substantially 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. The City 
claims that an agreement between Allegheny Power and 
Duquesne Light to withdraw Allegheny Power's application 
before the Public Utility Commission to provide electric 
service to two Redevelopment Zones within the City violated 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 The City also seeks 
injunctive relief against the proposed merger between the 
two utilities arguing that it violates Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.2 
 
The district court granted the utility companies' motions 
to dismiss, finding that given the allegations of the 
complaint, the City lacked standing because it had not 
experienced an antitrust injury. Because we agree that the 
City has failed to allege that it meets the prudential 
requirements of antitrust standing, we will affirm the 
decision of the district court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, in relevant part: "Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. S 1. 
 
2. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 18, states the following: 
 
       No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting 
       commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any 
part 
       of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the 
       jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the 
whole 
       or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in 
       commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line 
       of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of 
       the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
       lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 
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I. 
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND ALLEGATIONS 
 
As an initial matter, we must determine the extent of our 
consideration of the materials submitted by the parties. 
When deciding a motion to dismiss, it is the usual practice 
for a court to consider only the allegations contained in the 
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters 
of public record. See 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure S 1357 (2d ed. 1990). 
However, the parties here have provided the court with 
numerous documents pertaining to the regulatory 
proceedings that are at the heart of the instant controversy. 
We note -- as did the district court -- that it can be, and 
is in this instance, proper to consider these documents in 
reviewing a motion to dismiss. See Pension Benefits Guar. 
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 
1993) (finding that "a court may consider an undisputedly 
authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit 
to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff 's claims are based on 
the document. Otherwise, a plaintiff with a legally deficient 
claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by failing to 
attach a dispositive document on which it relied."). Our 
recounting of the averments of the complaint, therefore, is 
informed by the context provided by these documents and 
other public records of which we can take judicial notice.3 
Our factual recitation will also include a short discussion of 
the nature of the utility industry in Pennsylvania which 
provides the regulatory context of this case. 
 
The City of Pittsburgh, located in Allegheny County, is 
currently embarking on a plan to revitalize several urban 
areas, called the Redevelopment Zones, which were 
formerly industrial sites.4 According to the City's plans, 
these currently vacant sites will eventually be home to 
industrial, commercial and residential activity. Compl. 
PP 12, 13. The City believes that competition for retail 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Neither party contests the authenticity of these documents and all 
were submitted by the parties as the joint appendix in this case. 
 
4. The two areas to be redeveloped are the 123 acre "South Side Works" 
and the 233 acre "Nine Mile Run." Compl. P 12. 
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electric service would facilitate economic development in 
these areas. Id. P 14. This desire for competition comes at 
a time when the regulatory landscape for utilities in 
Pennsylvania is undergoing significant change. 
In Pennsylvania, the regulation of electric service 
distribution has traditionally afforded utility companies 
natural monopolies. See Barasch v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. 
Comm'n, 546 A.2d 1296, 1298 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). The 
industry operates in a comprehesive regulatory structure 
supervised by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
("PUC"), which is an independent administrative agency 
authorized by the state to regulate public utility companies 
doing business in Pennsylvania. 66 Pa. C.S.A. SS 301, 501. 
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Code gives the PUC broad 
power to "supervise and regulate" public utilities. Id. 
S 501(b). The PUC is mandated to act in the public interest 
in overseeing public utilities. A utility company must obtain 
a certificate of public convenience from the PUC in order to 
provide retail electric service to a particular area. Id. S 1101.5 
Each certificate describes the geographic territory in which 
the holder is permitted to supply electric service. Id. A 
certificate may be amended only with permission from the 
PUC, pursuant to 66 Pa.C.S.A. S 1102. Historically, a utility 
is able to enter another's service area only if it 
demonstrates that the area's certificated utility is providing 
inadequate service to customers in the proposed new 
territory. See Lansberry, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. 
Comm'n, 444 A.2d 832, 834-35 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982) 
(discussing requirement of demonstrating inadequacy of 
service in context of PUC certificate to transport). In 
addition, generally, the retail rates that a utility charges 
must be approved by the PUC. 66 Pa. C.S.A. S 1303. For 
example, the rates of both Allegheny Power and Duquesne 
Light are now, and have always been, subject to regulatory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. A certificate of public convenience "makes it lawful for [a] public 
utility 
to provide service within a defined territory, and imposes on the public 
utility an obligation to provide service in that territory." Lukens Steel 
Co. 
v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 499 A.2d 1134, 1136 n.1 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1985). 
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approval by the PUC. Further, the PUC reviews all proposed 
utility mergers. Id. SS 1102, 2811.6 
 
Recently, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the 
Electricity Generation Customer Choice and Competition 
Act. Id. S 2801 et seq. The Competition Act sets forth a plan 
that will gradually introduce competition within the retail 
generation function of the electric utility industry.7 This 
legislation envisions a transition from an industry which is 
largely regulated to one where there is a competitive 
market. This statute recognizes continued PUC oversight of 
electricity generation during the "transition" period from 
January 1, 1997 to January 1, 2001. Id. SS 2804, 2806. 
While the Competition Act will introduce some competition 
among electric service providers in Pennsylvania, it does 
not entirely displace the regulatory function of the PUC. 
Because the Competition Act did not alter the statutory 
requirement that Allegheny Power petition the PUC to 
amend its certificate, that Act's passage does not alter our 
analysis of this case. At all times relevant to the events 
recounted in the City's complaint, Allegheny Power and 
Duquesne Light were operating under the regulated 
industry conditions.8 
 
In the summer of 1996, Allegheny Power and Duquesne 
Light were the only electric utilities possessing certificates 
of public convenience from the PUC to provide electric 
service in Allegheny County. Compl. P 17. It is uncontested 
that Allegheny Power's certificate does not permit it to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. During the pendency of this litigation, the Allegheny Power and 
Duquesne Light merger was conditionally approved by the PUC. See 66 
U.S.L.W. 2689, 2696-97 (U.S. May 19, 1998) (discussing PUC decision In 
Re Joint Application of DQE Inc., Pa. P.U.C., No. A-110150F.0015, 
4/30/98). 
 
7. In its plans for the restructuring of the electric utility industry in 
Pennsylvania, the legislature distinguishes between the functions of 
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. Under the new 
statutory provisions, the transmission and distribution of electricity 
will 
continue to be treated as a natural monopoly and will still be subject to 
the supervision of the PUC. 66 Pa. C.S.A. S 2801 et seq. 
 
8. While the statute authorizes the initiation of "pilot programs" in 
1997, 
the parties in the present case have not contended that they were 
participants in this program. 66 Pa. C.S.A. S 2806 et seq. 
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provide electric service to the area of the City in which the 
Redevelopment Zones are located. JA at 197 (P 11). 
Duquesne Light is the only utility with a certificate to 
provide electric service to this area of the City. JA at 195 
(P 1). Duquesne Light claims that its certificate grants it the 
exclusive right to provide power to the Redevelopment 
Zones. Compl. P 28. Because of its belief that competition 
for retail electric power was "essential" to the success of 
this redevelopment effort, and because Allegheny Power's 
tariff rates are substantially lower than those of Duquesne 
Light, the City entered into discussions with Allegheny 
Power regarding the possibility of having Allegheny Power 
submit a proposal to provide electric service to the 
Redevelopment Zones. Id. PP 18, 20, 26. In furtherance of 
its goal of obtaining competitive utilities for the area, the 
City filed a "Petition in Support of Choice for Retail Electric 
Service Within Certain Redevelopment Zones Within the 
City of Pittsburgh" with the PUC in September of 1996. Id. 
P 22. Allegheny Power intervened in support of this petition 
and also filed a separate application with the PUC 
for permission to supply electrical service to the 
Redevelopment Zones. Id. PP 24, 30. Duquesne Light 
opposed both of these petitions. Id. PP 27, 32. 
 
In their petitions before the PUC both the City and 
Allegheny Power contested Duquesne Light's assertion of 
exclusive rights. A review of the applications made to the 
PUC is useful to clarify exactly what the City and Allegheny 
Power were seeking with respect to Allegheny Power's ability 
to offer electric service in the Redevelopment Zones. In its 
filing, the City requested that the PUC "take actions 
necessary to allow choice and competition for retail electric 
service in two discrete areas in the City undergoing 
redevelopment . . . wherein Duquesne Light Company .. . 
and [Allegheny Power Company] . . . would compete for new 
customers and new electric load." JA at 194 (emphasis 
added). Further, the City stated in this petition that "[t]o 
the best of the City's knowledge, Duquesne is at the present 
the only electric utility possessing a certificate of public 
convenience ("certificate") from the Commission to serve the 
City and its citizens." JA at 195 (P 1). In its reply to 
Duquesne Light's Answer to the City's Petition, the City 
states that it is requesting that the "two utilities, Duquesne 
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and [Allegheny Power], upon the latter's application and 
grant therefor, hold overlapping certificates to provide retail 
electric service in the two discrete Redevelopment Zones 
. . ." JA at 223 (P 24). 
 
In its filing to intervene in support of the City's petition, 
Allegheny Power asserted that it would "apply for authority 
to provide retail electric service in the Redevelopment Areas 
and that subject to approval of the Commission, [Allegheny 
Power] will provide retail electric service to the 
Redevelopment Areas pursuant to [Allegheny Power's] tariff 
rates and terms." JA at 200 (P 3). In its own application to 
the PUC, Allegheny Power requested approval for the utility 
"to begin to offer, render, furnish or supply electric service 
in two specific additional territories within the boundaries 
of the City of Pittsburgh." JA at 235 (emphasis added). 
These documents make clear that both the City and 
Allegheny Power were applying to the PUC so that Allegheny 
Power would be given the regulatory permission to begin to 
supply electric power in the area of the Redevelopment 
Zones. 
 
In November of 1996, the Urban Redevelopment 
Authority of Pittsburgh9 issued a Request for Proposals 
("RFP") soliciting bids for the provision of the "electric utility 
infrastructure development" of the Redevelopment Zones. 
Compl. P 33. Both Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light 
responded to the RFP with significantly different bids, 
Allegheny Power's being the lower of the two. Id. P 35. On 
February 25, 1997, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") 
held a prehearing conference on Allegheny Power's PUC 
application. At this hearing the ALJ set a schedule for the 
submission of testimony regarding Allegheny Power's 
application and scheduled further hearings for the week of 
June 9, 1997. Id. P 39. In March of 1997, the PUC 
consolidated the proceedings involving the City's petition 
with those of Allegheny Power's application. Id. P 40. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. According to the City, the Redevelopment Authority "works closely 
with the City to implement redevelopment plans that support and are 
consistent with the City's economic development objectives." Compl. 
P 33. 
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On April 7, 1997, Duquesne Light and Allegheny Power 
announced their intention to merge. Id. P 42. The City 
alleges that under the terms of the premerger agreement, 
the two utilities agreed that they would not file any 
applications with the government without prior 
consultation and would not make any changes with respect 
to rates without first consulting each other. Id. P 45. The 
City avers that these agreements constitute impermissible 
premerger coordination. Id. P 46. Later in April, Duquesne 
Light requested a stay of the PUC proceedings before the 
ALJ, which was denied. Id. P 48, 50. On June 6, 1997, 
Allegheny Power filed a petition to withdraw its PUC 
application and to withdraw as an intervenor in the City's 
pending PUC petition. Id. P 52. The ALJ granted these 
petitions. Id. P 54. After filing this complaint in federal 
court, the City petitioned the PUC for a stay of the 
regulatory proceedings. JA at 445. When this petition was 
denied, the City withdrew its petition seeking choice for 
retail electric service. JA at 523-28. Because the City's 
petition and Allegheny Power's application were withdrawn, 
the PUC never made a determination as to whether 
Duquesne Light's certificate gave it exclusive rights to serve 
the Redevelopment Zones or whether the Commission could 
or would amend Allegheny Power's certificate in order to 
permit it to provide electric service in these areas. 
 
In its complaint, the City contends that the actions of 
Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light violated 15 U.S.C. S 1 
("the Sherman Act") and 15 U.S.C. S 18 ("the Clayton Act"). 
The City asserts that it has suffered the following damage 
as a result of the alleged Sherman Act violations: 
"expending significant efforts to bring competition to the 
Redevelopment Zones; paying higher, non-competitive rates 
for electric utility service generally; and losing the 
opportunity to have lower electric service charges .. . ." 
Compl. P 59. The City seeks treble damages for the alleged 
Sherman Act violation.10 The City further argues that a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides for treble damages 
based on antitrust violations, states as follows: 
 
       [A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by 
       reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor 
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merger between the two utility companies violates the 
Clayton Act in that it would have anticompetitive effects, 
and thus seeks injunctive relief to prevent the proposed 
merger.11 Id. P 66. The City also raises the related state law 
claims of restraint of trade, civil conspiracy, breach of 
contract, tortious interference, breach of good faith and fair 
dealing, and detrimental reliance. 
 
Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light each moved to 
dismiss the City's complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). This motion was referred to a Magistrate Judge 
who issued a report recommending that the motions be 
granted. On January 6, 1998, the district court adopted 
this report thereby granting defendants' motions to dismiss 
and declining to exercise jurisdiction over the City's state 
law claims. The City filed this timely appeal. Our 
jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. S 1291.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       in any district court of the United States in the district in which 
the 
       defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to 
the 
       amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by 
       him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable 
       attorney's fee. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 15. 
 
11. Section 16, which provides for injunctive relief, states, in pertinent 
part: 
 
       Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to 
sue 
       for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States 
       having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or 
       damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . when and under 
the 
       same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against 
       threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by 
       courts of equity . . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. S 26. 
 
12. We exercise plenary review over the district court's grant of 
defendants' motions to dismiss. Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 
95 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 1996). In so doing, we accept as true all 
factual allegations in the complaint and will not affirm the motion to 
dismiss "unless it is certain that no relief can be granted under any set 
of facts which could be proved." Fuentes v. South Hills Cardiology, 946 
F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 
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II. 
 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING 
 
The district court granted the defendants' motions to 
dismiss because the City lacked standing to bring an 
antitrust claim. It reasoned that there had been no 
antitrust injury to the City for two reasons: 
 
First, since Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light had not 
engaged in competition in light of their regulated provision 
of services, the agreement between Duquesne Light and 
Allegheny Power to withdraw Allegheny Power's bid, as well 
as the proposed merger, did not lessen competition. City of 
Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., ___ F. Supp. ___, 1998 
WL 64074, at * 4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 1998). As to the City's 
claim that the proposed merger would eliminate prospective 
competition, the court found this claim to be too 
speculative to be actionable. Id. 
 
Second, the court found that the City was denied an 
opportunity that was contingent on the decision of the PUC 
and thus, the fact that no competition existed was the 
result of the regulatory structure. Id. at *5. The district 
court found that as the City's alleged damages were not the 
result of harm to competition, they did not constitute the 
type of injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. 
Id. at *4-5. The district court therefore concluded that, 
because any injury that was experienced or threatened was 
not an antitrust injury, the City lacked standing to pursue 
its claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Id. at *5. 
 
III. 
 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
The City contests the district court's conclusion, arguing 
that the allegations of the complaint regarding the loss of 
competition are sufficient to allege the type of injury the 
antitrust laws are designed to prevent. It contends that the 
district court's ruling that the City did not have standing 
due to lack of antitrust injury fails to properly consider not 
only its allegations but also the applicable law regarding 
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antitrust injury. We review plaintiff 's complaint not to 
determine whether the City has averred harm to 
competition -- which it has -- but, rather, to determine 
whether the injury the City alleges can legally form the 
basis for relief under the antitrust laws. 
 
The City contends that the district court ignored the 
allegations of the elimination of competition, arguing that 
the court should have taken the allegations of its complaint 
at face value. Yet our courts have an obligation in matters 
before them to view the complaint as a whole and to base 
rulings not upon the presence of mere words but, rather, 
upon the presence of a factual situation which is or is not 
justiciable. We do draw on the allegations of the complaint, 
but in a realistic, rather than a slavish, manner.13 In 
scrutinizing plaintiff's claim in this way at the outset, we 
are mindful of the balance that must be struck in assessing 
antitrust claims. As the Supreme Court stated, referring to 
standing in the context of S 4 of the Clayton Act: 
 
       [N]either the statutory language nor the legislative 
       history of S 4 offers any focused guidance on the 
       question of which injuries are too remote from the 
       violation and the purposes of the antitrust laws to form 
       the predicate for a suit under S 4; indeed, the 
       unrestrictive language of the section, and the avowed 
       breadth of the congressional purpose, cautions us not 
       to cabin S 4 in ways that will defeat its broad remedial 
       objective. But the potency of the remedy implies the 
       need for some care in its application. 
 
Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 
(1982). 
 
Regulatory Framework 
 
The present case arises in a factual context which is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. For example, we need not accept as true "unsupported conclusions 
and unwarranted inferences." Schuylkill Energy Resources, Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 435 (1997). Nor can we "assume that the [plaintiff] 
can prove facts that it has not alleged . . . ." Associated Gen. 
Contractors 
of California v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 
(1983). 
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substantially different from that of most antitrust cases. 
The plaintiff has alleged anticompetitive behavior in an 
industry which is highly regulated: those who wish to 
compete to provide their services must obtain a certificate 
from the PUC to do so. As the First Circuit has explained, 
"[f]ull price regulation dramatically alters the calculus of 
antitrust harms and benefits." Town of Concord, Mass. v. 
Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding 
that alleged price squeeze did not violate Sherman Act 
because utility's rates were regulated). Similarly, here, the 
regulation which frames the issue is the statutory 
requirement that a utility obtain permission from the PUC, 
in the form of a certificate, in order to provide electric 
service to a particular geographic region. 
 
The Supreme Court has made clear that regulated 
industries -- even those that historically have been treated 
as natural monopolies -- are not exempt from the antitrust 
laws. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States , 410 U.S. 
366 (1973). However, in this case, the comprehensive 
regulatory framework significantly restricts the nature of 
the competition which is permitted. While it is true that the 
regulatory landscape of the electric power industry is in the 
process of changing, even the Competition Act does not 
anticipate a completely "free market" for electric services. 
Rather, the changes will result in a form of regulated 
competition. Further, in the words of the Schuylkill Energy 
court, "We will not attempt to predict the future of 
competitive retail access in Pennsylvania." Schuylkill Energy 
Resources, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 
405, 416 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 435 (1997). We 
cannot know whether these two utilities will ever be 
permitted to compete for retail customers in a particular 
geographic region. 
 
Antitrust Standing 
 
The question of standing is a threshold inquiry in all 
actions. However, the constitutional and prudential 
requirements of standing take on particular significance in 
the context of the antitrust laws, where a balance must be 
struck between encouraging private actions and deterring 
legitimate competitive activity through overly vigorous 
enforcement. See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assoc. v. Mohawk 
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Valley Med. Assoc., 996 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(cautioning that were the "heavy power [of antitrust law] 
brought into play too readily it would not safeguard 
competition, but destroy it"). Thus, in undertaking this 
standing analysis, we must remain mindful of the purposes 
and goals of the antitrust laws at issue -- to preserve and 
promote competition. 
 
The constitutional standing inquiry -- namely, whether 
there is a "case" or "controversy" within the meaning of 
Article III, S 2 of the Constitution -- is augmented by 
consideration of prudential limitations. Without these 
prudential considerations, "the courts would be called upon 
to decide abstract questions of wide public significance 
even though other governmental institutions may be more 
competent . . . and judicial intervention may be 
unnecessary to protect individual rights." Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
 
Thus, the crux of the issue in this case is whether the 
City satisfies the "prudential" requirements of standing; 
that is, does the City have "antitrust standing," and is the 
plaintiff a proper party to bring a private antitrust action? 
In Associated General, the Supreme Court outlined the 
factors that courts should consider when determining 
whether a party has standing to bring a private action 
under the antitrust laws. Associated Gen. Contractors of 
California v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519, 537-45 (1983). Its approach to the standing inquiry 
has been interpreted as requiring a narrowing view, as 
opposed to the broad remedial purpose approach of cases 
that preceded it. See Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 1997). The 
Associated General test has been regularly and consistently 
applied as the passageway through which antitrust 
plaintiffs must advance, and we have recently restated the 
factors we are to examine: 
 
       (1) the causal connection between the antitrust 
       violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the intent by 
       the defendant to cause that harm, with neither factor 
       alone conferring standing; (2) whether the plaintiff's 
       alleged injury is of the type for which the antitrust laws 
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       were intended to provide redress;14 (3) the directness of 
       the injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal 
       application of standing principles might produce 
       speculative claims; (4) the existence of more direct 
       victims of the alleged antitrust violations; and (5) the 
       potential for duplicative recovery or complex 
       apportionment of damages. 
 
Barton & Pittinos, 118 F.3d at 181 (citing In re Lower Lake 
Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1165-66 (3d 
Cir. 1993)). The antitrust standing inquiry is essentially the 
same under both S 4 and S 7 of the Clayton Act, except that 
when seeking injunctive relief, "the complainant need only 
demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an 
impending violation of the antitrust laws." Mid-West Paper 
Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 591 
(3d Cir. 1979) (quotation omitted); see also Cargill, Inc. v. 
Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111-112 (1986). 
Furthermore, this court has emphasized that the antitrust 
standing inquiry is not a black-letter rule, but rather, is 
"essentially a balancing test comprised of many constant 
and variable factors . . . ." Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar 
Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 964-65 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing 
Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d 
Cir. 1977)). 
 
We conclude that, balancing all of the relevant facts in 
the instant case, the City's claims fail to meet the standing 
requirements we have set forth, due to the lack of causal 
connection between the defendants' actions and the alleged 
harm and because of the absence of antitrust injury. We 
will combine our discussion of causation and injury as the 
two issues are inextricable in this case. Further, we find 
that because there is no causal connection and no antitrust 
injury, we need not examine the other Associated General 
standing factors. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. This element of the standing test is the"antitrust injury" 
requirement. 
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IV. 
 
CAUSAL CONNECTION AND ANTITRUST INJURY 
 
In evaluating the factors necessary for standing, we have 
stated that a showing of "[a]ntitrust injury is a necessary 
but insufficient condition of antitrust standing." Barton & 
Pittinos, 118 F.3d at 182. By this we mean that the district 
court should first address the issue of whether the plaintiff 
suffered an antitrust injury. If antitrust injury is not found, 
further inquiry is unnecessary. 
 
In explaining its reasoning, the district court cited the 
following passage from Brunswick, which defines "antitrust 
injury": 
 
       Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say 
       injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to 
       prevent and that flows from that which makes 
       defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the 
       anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of 
       anticompetive acts made possible by the violation. 
 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 
489 (1977). 
 
From the Court's description of antitrust injury, we learn 
that the question of whether the plaintiff has experienced 
antitrust injury depends in part on its source -- did the 
injury flow from that which makes the defined acts 
unlawful. To answer this question, we must examine the 
causal connection between the purportedly unlawful 
conduct and the injury.15 In this case, we find that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. As many commentators and courts have noted, the questions of 
antitrust injury and antitrust standing are difficult to disentangle. We 
believe that, similarly, in the present case, there is no bright line 
distinction between the two concepts. See, e.g., Greater Rockford Energy 
& Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391, 394-95 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc., 753 F.2d 242, 247 (2d Cir. 1985); 
see also Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law P 360(e), 
at 200 (1995); William Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust 
Violations, 
37 Stan. L. Rev. 1445, 1484-85 (1985); Nat Stern & Kevin Getzendanner, 
Comment, Gauging the Impact of Associated General Contractors on 
Antitrust Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 20 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 159, 175-179 (1986); Daniel Richman, Note, Antitrust Standing, 
Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se Standard, 93 Yale L.J. 1309 (1984). 
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determining whether antitrust injury is present necessarily 
involves examining whether there is a causal connection 
between the violation alleged and the injury. 
 
Accordingly, rather than trying to separate these two 
factors of causation and injury, we will treat them together. 
The facts which form the basis for the district court's 
conclusion, and ours as well, are central to both tests. 
These facts include the following: Allegheny Power and 
Duquesne Light were never competitors; the regulatory 
scheme mandated that they not compete; attempts by the 
City and Allegheny Power to bring about competition were 
no more than attempts, with no assurance that competition 
would be permitted; and any injury suffered by the City did 
not flow from the defendants' conduct, but, rather, from the 
realities of the regulated environment in which all three 
were actors. Here, both the lack of any antitrust injury -- 
in the sense of its total absence as defined by the district 
court -- and the attenuated nature of the causation, defeat 
the City's standing. 
 
We should note at the outset that we disagree with the 
City's argument that Brunswick and the other cases 
discussing antitrust injury cited by the district court are 
inapposite because they involved suits by competitors, not 
by consumers.16 The City urges that as long as the City is 
a consumer -- as it contends it is -- harm to it constitutes 
antitrust injury.17 However, we do not find the City's status 
as a consumer to be dispositive. We read the cited passage 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. In Brunswick, several smaller operators of bowling alleys sued a 
larger operator who was also a bowling equipment manufacturer. 
According to the plaintiffs, Brunswick's activity of acquiring failing 
alleys 
and providing cash to keep them afloat violated Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act. They argued this continued competition reduced their profits. Using 
the test set forth above, the Supreme Court held these lost profits did 
not constitute "antitrust injury." Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. 
 
17. In its complaint, the City alleged that it was bringing this action 
"on 
its own behalf as a purchaser of electric utility service" and "on behalf 
of its citizens and to protect the economy of Pittsburgh." Compl. P 4. 
Defendants contest the City's ability to bring this action on behalf of 
its 
citizens. It is, however, uncontested that the City will be a purchaser of 
electricity -- for streets, public works, and other infrastructure -- in 
the 
Redevelopment Zones though it is not now a purchaser in these areas. 
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from Brunswick, and the opinion itself, to have broader 
application. Brunswick tells us to intensify our focus and 
consider not only the fact that there may be an agreement 
which is harming others in the marketplace, but to also ask 
first whether the alleged injury is really of the type that the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent, and, as part of that 
assessment, whether the injury flows from that which 
makes defendants' acts unlawful. 
 
The key sentence in Brunswick, cited above, is the last: 
"The injury should reflect the . . . anticompetitive acts made 
possible by the violation." 429 U.S. at 489. It directs us to 
look back from the vantagepoint of the injury to test the 
nature of the cause, rather than to presume antitrust 
injury wherever there is an agreement or merger that 
results in harm. This inquiry led to a conclusion of that the 
plaintiff lacked standing in Brunswick. Although the 
analysis is slightly different, the same result follows on the 
facts of this case. The purported lessening of competition 
was not caused by the premerger agreement and proposed 
merger between Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light. The 
City's inability to choose to buy from either Allegheny Power 
or Duquesne Light for the Redevelopment Zones is an 
injury visited upon it by the regulated nature of utility 
services, not caused by an agreement between Duquesne 
Light and Allegheny Power to withdraw Allegheny Power's 
application to be able to compete. 
 
The City's position that it has suffered an antitrust injury 
is an attempt to equate the submission of bids andfiling of 
petitions with actual competition. The City's complaint 
states that the City engaged in "negotiations with Allegheny 
Power for the provision of electric utility service to the 
Redevelopment Zones, subject to Allegheny Power obtaining 
a certificate from the PUC." Compl. P 41. The City 
acknowledges that competition was not possible without 
PUC approval when it requested that the PUC "take actions 
necessary to allow choice and competition for retail electric 
service" in the Redevelopment Zones. JA at 194. Thus, we 
need not resolve the issue of whether Duquesne Light's 
certificate to provide electricity to the Redevelopment Zones 
was exclusive. Rather, it is sufficient that we can determine 
from the face of the complaint that Allegheny Power never 
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had the certificate from the PUC necessary to permit it to 
provide power in the Redevelopment Zones. It never did 
compete, and, therefore, any injury to the City did not 
result from a lessening of competition. In fact, as the 
district court correctly points out, the actions of the utilities 
merely maintained the status quo. Thus, the utilities' 
purported antitrust violation can only be said to have been 
competition-neutral and as such, is not actionable. See 
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 
344 (1990) (stating that "[t]he antitrust injury requirement 
ensures that a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems 
from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the 
defendant's behavior"). 
 
The district court concluded that because neither the 
agreement nor the proposed merger had brought about the 
lessening of competition in a "marketplace" where there was 
no competition, there was no antitrust injury. Wefind this 
conclusion of the district court to be well founded, 
notwithstanding the City's bold averments as to loss of 
competition. Without demonstrating that there was 
competition, a plaintiff cannot show that the defendants' 
actions have had or will have anticompetitive effects. See, 
e.g., Continental Cablevision of Ohio, Inc. v. American Elec. 
Power Co., 715 F.2d 1115, 1119-20 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding 
that without competition, there can be no injury to 
competition). 
 
It is telling that nowhere in the complaint does the City 
directly aver that there had ever been competition between 
Duquesne Light and Allegheny Power.18 The City argues 
that it is the competitive process that antitrust laws are 
designed to protect -- and that the submission of bids in 
response to the RFP constitutes a "competitive process." 
However, this argument does little to further the City's 
position because, in the present case, the competitive 
process does not even exist because of regulatory 
restraints. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Paragraphs 9 & 10 of the City's complaint contain nearly identical 
statements regarding the business of each utility, but contains no 
averment that the two companies compete. Elsewhere in the complaint, 
harm to competition is averred in broad, conclusory terms. See Compl. 
P 66. 
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The City's first claim is brought under the Sherman Act, 
which prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies "in 
restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. S 1. However, under the 
Sherman Act agreements can only restrain that which has 
occurred, is occurring, or is reasonably likely to occur. 
Since the realization of competition is in the hands of 
regulators there is no way that the City can show that 
competition would have occurred absent the concerted 
activity between the two utilities. 
 
The City's Clayton Act claim fails under a similar 
analysis. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits all mergers 
"where in any line of commerce, or in any activity affecting 
commerce in any section of the country, the effect may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly." 15 U.S.C. S 18. The complaint avers that the 
relevant "line of commerce" for the Clayton Act claim is the 
"provision of retail electric utility service in the 
Redevelopment Zones." Compl. P 62. The City argues that 
the proposed merger will lessen competition by "eliminating 
actual and prospective competition between Allegheny 
Power and Duquesne Light in the relevant line of commerce 
. . ." Id. P 66(a). The only "actual competition" that the City 
alleges in its complaint is the competition to be able to 
provide electric power to the Redevelopment Zones, which 
does not constitute actual competition. 
 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act does permit injunctive relief 
"against threatened loss or damage." 15 U.S.C.S 26; see 
Mid-West Paper Products Co., 596 F.2d at 590-91. 19 The 
City argues that the fact that the proposed merger will 
lessen "prospective competition" should be sufficient to 
state a claim. However, we agree with the reasoning of the 
district court that the threatened loss "is contingent on the 
PUC permitting competition within the City in thefirst 
instance." Thus, with respect to the "prospective injury" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The City has not explicitly argued this case under a "potential 
competition" theory and therefore we will not address that issue here. 
We do note, however, that the cases articulating this theory would be of 
doubtful support to the City. See, e.g. , United States v. El Paso Natural 
Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 
410 U.S. 526 (1973). 
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argument, the issue turns not on whether Allegheny Power 
and Duquesne Light did compete -- but whether they were 
going to compete for the ability to provide power in the 
Redevelopment Zones. Allegheny Power was not legally able 
to provide power in the Redevelopment Zones and we do 
not know whether the PUC would ever have granted the 
permission for it to do so. Thus, as a matter of law, the 
court cannot conclude that the loss of potential competition 
was causally related to the decision of the two power 
companies to merge. The City is really claiming that it 
would have benefited from competition it hoped would 
occur. However, the appellants cannot foist their version of 
what might have been on the court under the rubric of 
antitrust injury. The presence of the regulatory scheme and 
need for approval in connection with the choice of utilities 
to serve the Redevelopment Zones cuts the causal chain 
and converts what might have been deemed antitrust injury 
in a free market into only a speculative exercise. 
 
There are no facts averred in the complaint which even 
permit us to speculate as to the likelihood of the PUC 
granting certification to Allegheny Power. Further, the City 
does not allege, and there is nothing in the record to 
indicate, that any parties considered these applications to 
be mere administrative formalities. To the contrary, the 
PUC applications filed by the City and Allegheny Power -- 
and the responses to them by Duquesne Light -- make 
clear that PUC proceedings to amend Allegheny Power's 
certificate were already being vigorously contested. See, 
e.g., JA at 267-287. Thus, we simply cannot know whether 
there is any causal connection between the harm which has 
arguably been suffered by the City and the alleged Sherman 
Act violation. 
 
As the Supreme Court stated in Brunswick, antitrust 
injury must be caused by the antitrust violation-- not a 
mere causal link, but a direct effect. 429 U.S. at 489. Here, 
the interposition of the regulatory scheme and actions of 
the parties -- both defendants and plaintiff -- interferes 
with the chain of causation. The statutory scheme 
precluded competition without the requisite regulatory 
permission. As Professors Areeda & Hovenkamp describe, 
"a plaintiff cannot be injured in fact by private conduct 
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excluding him from the market when a statute prevents 
him from entering that market in any event." Phillip E. 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law P 363(b), at 
222 (1995) (citing Axis S.p.A. v. Micafil, Inc., 870 F.2d 1105 
(6th Cir. 1989)). 
 
As Areeda & Hovenkamp explain, the Section 4 plaintiff 
"must establish that he actually `sustained' injury-in-fact to 
`business or property,' and the `by reason of ' language [of 
S 4] insists that such injury be caused by the violation." Id. 
P 360, at 192. The requirements for injunctive relief are 
similar except that the statutory language of Section 16 
permits relief upon a showing of "threatened loss." 
However, the plaintiff must still demonstrate that this 
"threatened injury would be caused by the alleged antitrust 
violation . . . ." Id. P 360(b), at 193 (emphasis added). Thus, 
the City will never be able to prove a direct link between the 
alleged antitrust violation and their purported injury. The 
absence of antitrust injury and causal connection clearly 
defeat the City's standing. 
 
The lack of causal connection between the violation 
alleged and the City's injuries is further demonstrated when 
we examine the damages alleged by the City. The injury is 
not only "speculative" because it is difficult to measure; 
rather, it is speculative because the injury claimed may 
never occur. An examination of the following damages listed 
in the City's complaint reveals no direct link between the 
purported antitrust violations and the harm alleged to have 
been suffered by the City: "expending significant efforts to 
bring competition to the Redevelopment Zones; paying 
higher, non-competitive rates for electric utility service 
generally; and losing the opportunity to have lower electric 
service charges in the Redevelopment Zones necessary to 
attract the maximum intended economic development to 
the Zones and foster full economic growth." Compl. P 59. 
The City has failed to offer any support for the proposition 
that the first alleged harm -- the fact that the City spent 
money to bring competition to the Redevelopment Zones -- 
is a cognizable antitrust injury.20 The other damages are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The proper measure of damages for a price-fixing violation under the 
Sherman Act is the difference between the prices actually paid and those 
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precisely the type which cannot be directly connected to the 
alleged agreement. There is no way to determine whether 
the rates the City will pay for electric service are or will be 
affected by the alleged actions of Allegheny Power and 
Duquesne Light. A consumer alleging antitrust violations 
"cannot obtain damages without showing that he actually 
paid more than he would have paid in the absence of the 
violation." Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, P 370, at 253. 
 
In its complaint, the City alleges a violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act and requests that "defendants be 
ordered to pay the City damages sustained by it and the 
citizens it represents, trebled . . ." Compl. P 93. However, 
there is no way for the court to determine what "damages" 
were sustained. We cannot assume the existence of a PUC 
certificate for the purposes of assessing damages. Thus, the 
damages alleged by the City are not simply difficult to 
measure, but their occurrence would, in fact, be impossible 
to prove. The injury averred by the City is simply too 
speculative to permit relief under the antitrust laws. 
 
With respect to injunctive relief, the City cannot show a 
significant threat of injury from an impending antitrust 
violation. The City cannot prove that harm is threatened 
because it cannot demonstrate that it has lost anything -- 
namely, competition among electric utilities -- that would 
have existed but for the actions of the defendants. Further, 
now that all parties, including the City, have withdrawn 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that would have been paid absent the conspiracy. See, e.g., State of N.Y. 
v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065, 1077 (2d Cir. 1988); see also 
Robert Blair & William Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70 Wash. 
L. Rev. 423, 426 (1995) (Plaintiff must project a "hypothetical or `but-
for' 
condition that excludes only the effects of the defendant's illegal 
conduct." Damages are measured by "[t]he difference between that 
projected condition and the plaintiff's actual condition."). The injury 
alleged by the City here is purportedly separate from the injury of having 
to pay higher prices for electric service. In fact, the language of this 
claim merely underscores the fact that no competition existed between 
the two utilities. When a market participant expends resources to 
encourage competition, the participant risks that such expenditure will 
not result in lower prices. Despite this risk, the City chose to pursue 
its 
"efforts" with Allegheny Power. 
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from the regulatory proceedings, an injunction would not 
alter the City's current situation. That is, the question of 
whether the PUC would amend Allegheny Power's certificate 
and permit it to provide electric service to the 
Redevelopment Zones would remain unresolved. 
 
We affirm the district court's conclusion that because 
there had previously been no competition in the market for 
electricity, "neither the proposed merger nor the withdrawal 
of Allegheny Power's application has lessened the 
competition within the City or the choices of utility 
companies available to the City." City of Pittsburgh, 1998 
WL 64074, at * 4. Thus, as the district court notes, it is the 
structure of the regulated industry, not the defendants' 
conduct, which creates the lack of competition -- and 
under these facts -- the lack of antitrust standing. That 
does not mean that utilities are immune from antitrust 
liability.21 However, in the present case, the remedy that 
appellant seeks would require this court to assume the 
existence of a competitive situation. This we cannot do. 
 
The City argues that if the antitrust laws are not 
diligently enforced during the transition to deregulation 
under the Competition Act, there is a risk that regulated 
electric utility monopolies will simply be replaced by 
unregulated ones who would also enjoy immunity from the 
antitrust laws. We make clear that this ruling is fact- 
specific to the current climate in which the instant facts 
developed, namely, in the era of "regulated electric utility 
monopolies" as the City terms it. The very essence of our 
ruling is that the advent of deregulation will likely remove 
the break in the causal chain so that future utility 
arrangements in the free market atmosphere may well pass 
muster for purposes of standing under the antitrust laws. 
Had the ability of the utilities to serve various customers in 
various regions not been subject to approval of the PUC, 
our standing analysis would be radically different. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Further, this decision does not affect the City's ability to proceed 
in 
state court on its state law claims for restraint of trade, civil 
conspiracy, 
breach of contract, tortious interference, breach of good faith and fair 
dealing, and detrimental reliance. 
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In conclusion, because we believe that the City cannot 
establish the necessary antitrust injury and causal 
connection between the alleged antitrust violation and its 
injury, we will affirm the district court's grant of 
defendants' motions to dismiss. 
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HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I cannot agree with the majority that there is no antitrust 
injury or no causal connection between the City's injury 
and the defendants' conduct. The defendants conspired to 
deprive the City of the opportunity to obtain less expensive 
electricity to assist in bringing new jobs to the City. In my 
view, the majority opinion opens the door for similar anti- 
competitive practices to go unpunished. 
 
I accept the statement of facts set forth by the majority, 
but supplement it in order to underscore the bad faith 
exhibited by Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light Company.1 
Attempting to create new jobs in the Redevelopment Zones, 
the City recognized that high-cost electricity was a 
detriment to attracting new businesses. Estimating that the 
Redevelopment Zones would support up to 7,300 new jobs 
and approximately 1,400 new residences, the City began 
negotiating with Allegheny Power to provide less expensive 
electricity. 
 
The City and Allegheny Power negotiated for several 
months and Allegheny Power assured the City that it would 
provide less expensive electricity than Duquesne Light 
Company to the Redevelopment Zones. Both Allegheny 
Power and the City knew that the permission of the PUC 
was required before Allegheny Power could furnish 
electricity. In July 1996, both the City and Allegheny Power 
agreed to apply to the PUC for the latter to provide 
electricity to the Redevelopment Zones. On September 4, 
1996, the City filed a petition supporting Allegheny Power's 
provision of electricity to the Redevelopment Zones. On 
September 9, 1996, Allegheny Power filed its own petition 
in this matter and represented to the PUC that an 
"alternative electric supply would attract economic 
development to the Redevelopment Areas and would foster 
economic growth[.]" (J.A. at 6.) 
 
Claiming that it had the exclusive right to provide 
electricity to the City, Duquesne Light Company intervened 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We accept all of the City's allegations as true in reviewing the motion 
to dismiss. Fuentes v. South Hills Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 
1991) (citation omitted). 
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on September 27, 1996, opposing the petitions filed by the 
City and Allegheny Power. On October 21, 1996, Allegheny 
Power filed an answer, claiming that it also had the right to 
provide electricity to the Redevelopment Zones. After these 
preliminary matters had been addressed, on October 28, 
1996, Allegheny Power formally applied for a certificate of 
need, which would enable it to provide electricity to the 
Redevelopment Zones. In its application, Allegheny Power 
claimed that its prices would be substantially lower than 
Duquesne Light Company's, stating: "It is certain that the 
potential for developing new, incremental electrical load in 
the Redevelopment Zones will be enhanced substantially if 
electricity prices therein are as low as possible." (Id.) 
 
On November 18, 1996, the City solicited bids from 
Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light Company to provide 
power to the Redevelopment Zones. As the majority points 
out, Allegheny Power significantly under-bid Duquesne 
Light Company. While the ALJ received testimony on the 
application in late March 1997, further hearings were 
scheduled for June 9, 1997. 
 
Less than two weeks later, on April 7, 1997, Duquesne 
Light Company and Allegheny Power announced that they 
had agreed to merge. Two days earlier, on April 5, 1997, 
Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light Company agreed not 
to make any filings with governmental entities until they 
consulted with each other; not to change their regulated 
charges or rates without first discussing it with each other; 
and not to make any agreement or filing with respect to a 
rate change or charge without first consulting each other. 
 
After deciding to merge, on April 28, 1997, Allegheny 
Power and Duquesne Light Company requested a stay of 
the proceedings on Allegheny Power's application for a 
certificate of need. The ALJ denied the stay, noting the need 
for an expeditious decision. On June 6, 1997, Allegheny 
Power petitioned the ALJ for leave to withdraw its 
application. The ALJ granted the petition on June 24, 1997. 
The City then commenced this action alleging, in 
substance, that Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light 
Company conspired to deprive the City of the opportunity 
to obtain less expensive electricity in violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
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The facts alleged by the City are sufficient to show that 
Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light Company conspired 
to deprive the City of an opportunity to obtain less 
expensive electricity. In my view, this conspiracy violated 
both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Unlike the majority, I 
am not persuaded that the PUC's failure to act on 
Allegheny Power's application immunizes these conspirators 
from antitrust liability. After all, the conspiracy deprived 
the PUC of an opportunity to review the application. 2 As the 
Seventh Circuit aptly pointed out, "[w]e know of no rule 
that states that the parties must be in head-to-head 
competition in the relevant market (as opposed to head-to- 
head competition for the relevant market) before the 
antitrust laws will apply." Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 
F.2d 520, 531 (7th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). 
 
The Clayton Act prohibits mergers that substantially 
lessen competition or tend to create monopolies in any line 
of commerce in any section of the country. There can be no 
doubt that the proposed merger in this case violates the 
Clayton Act. Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light 
Company are the only utility companies that could feasibly 
provide electricity to the Redevelopment Zones. 
Consequently, the proposed merger substantially lessens 
competition and creates a monopoly in the relevant market. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The majority, however, argues "now that all parties, including the 
City, 
have withdrawn from the regulatory proceedings, an injunction would 
not alter the City's current situation." In essence, the majority argues 
that because the City withdrew from the PUC proceedings, the issue is 
moot as to whether an injunction should be granted. However, once 
Allegheny withdrew its application, there was no point for the City to 
continue with its application. As the appellees point out themselves, 
Allegheny had to obtain approval from the PUC to enlarge its certificate 
of convenience. See Makovsky Bros., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Comm., 423 A.2d 1089, 1092 (Pa. Commw. 1980). The City alone, as the 
consumer, could not petition the PUC to obtain lower utility prices. 
Lukens Steel Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm., 499 A.2d 1134, 
1140 (Pa. Commw. 1985). Thus, once Allegheny withdrew, under 
Pennsylvania law, there was no point for the City to continue with its 
application. Instead, the City filed suit in federal district court. 
Although 
the law is changing in Pennsylvania as utility competition becomes a 
reality, there is no indication that the City could have proceeded ex 
parte 
before the PUC to ensure that Allegheny provide lower electricity rates. 
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The Sherman Act addresses agreements in restraint of 
trade. In this case, there was such a restraint. The merger 
agreement destroyed the City's opportunity to obtain less 
expensive electricity. In this case, the City's allegations 
support the view that there was such a restraint. According 
to these allegations, the merger agreement destroyed the 
opportunity to obtain less expensive electricity. A factfinder 
might well determine that this opportunity was more than 
speculative; it was real enough to cause Allegheny Power to 
file its application; it was real enough to cause Duquesne 
Light Company to oppose the application; and it was real 
enough to convince Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light 
Company that a merger was the most effective way of 
avoiding cost competition.3 In short, "the injury alleged by 
[the City] was precisely the type of loss that the claimed 
violations of the antitrust laws would be likely to cause." 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 125 
(1969). 
 
I am concerned that today's decision sends the wrong 
message that similarly situated conspirators will not be 
held accountable for their anti-competitive activities. After 
submitting bids, both Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light 
Company knew the price at which each company would 
provide electricity to the City. When Allegheny Power 
withdrew its bid, Duquesne Light Company was assured 
that competition would be lessened and that its higher 
price would prevail. 
 
In my view, the majority does not sufficiently distinguish 
between the City's S 4 and S 16 claims under the Clayton 
Act. Even if one concedes that the claim for monetary 
damages under the Clayton and Sherman Acts presents a 
close question, there can be no doubt that the City has 
standing to pursue its requested injunctive relief under S 16 
of the Clayton Act. It is well settled in the Third Circuit 
that, unlike a claim under S 4 of the Clayton Act for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Certainly the amount of damages that the City might recover may be 
limited by the fact that the PUC would not have approved the 
application, but this fact goes to the amount of damages that can be 
recovered rather than whether an antitrust violation has been 
committed. 
 
                                29 
  
monetary damages, "a claim for injunctive relief does not 
present the countervailing considerations--such as the risk 
of duplicative or ruinous recoveries and the spectre of a 
trial burdened with complex and conjectural economic 
analyses--that the Supreme Court emphasized when 
limiting the availability of treble damages" in a S 4 Clayton 
Act claim. Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, 
596 F.2d 573, 591 (3d Cir. 1979). Consequently, 
 
       In contradistinction to S 4, S 16 does not ground 
       injunctive relief upon a showing that "injury" has been 
       already sustained, but instead makes it available 
       "against threatened loss or damage." Furthermore, S 16 
       does not state that the threat must be to the plaintiff's 
       "business or property," and courts accordingly have 
       held that non-commercial interests are also protected. 
       . . . [C]ourts have held that for purposes of S 16 the 
       complainant "need only demonstrate a significant 
       threat of injury from an impending violation of the 
       antitrust laws or from a contemporary violation likely 
       to continue or recur," and that a person may have 
       standing to obtain injunctive relief even when he is 
       denied standing to sue for treble damages. Indeed, the 
       test for standing under S 16 has been framed in terms 
       of a proximate cause standard that is "less 
       constrained" than that under S 4 and which might in 
       fact be no more rigorous than the general rule of 
       standing. 
 
Mid-West Paper Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d 
573, 591-92 (3d Cir. 1979) (emphasis in original) (footnotes 
omitted). Therefore, the district court can still fashion 
injunctive relief that will bar the merger, require Allegheny 
Power to reinstate its application to the PUC to furnish 
power to the City's Redevelopment Zones, even if the 
merger is permitted to go through,4 or alternatively, to give 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In an October 17, 1997 letter from Allegheny Power's president, Alan 
Noia, to Pittsburgh Mayor Thomas Murphy, Noia states: "I am, therefore, 
committing to you that, if the . . . PUC grants the City's request . . . 
to 
allow utilities other than Duquesne Light Company to provide electric 
service to the two economic development zones, subject to PUC approval, 
. . . [Allegheny Power] will expand its service territory to include the 
economic development zones." (J.A. at 499a.) This letter was sent after 
the proposed merger. 
 
                                30 
  
such other relief as will ensure that the City obtains the 
advantage of competitive pricing. 
 
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent. 
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